How Carbon Taxes and Subsidies Affect the Implementation of Low-carbon Housing? An Evolutionary Game Theory Analysis

Wenwen Lv^*Jun Li^*

• Logistics Department of Wuhan Fourth Hospital, Wuhan Fourth Hospital, Wuhan, China

This study explores the mechanisms by which carbon taxes and subsidies can incentivize low-carbon housing through the construction of a stochastic evolutionary game model. The evolutionary process of low-carbon housing development, whether under a carbon tax policy or a low-carbon subsidy policy, includes three stages: (1) the initial stage, where relying solely on government subsidies or carbon taxes is insufficient to effectively implement low-carbon housing under various noise intensities; (2) the development stage, where as the proportions of real estate developers adopting low-carbon strategies and homebuyers purchasing low-carbon housing increase, a chaotic relationship emerges between the implementation of carbon taxes, subsidies, and low-carbon housing under certain noise intensities; and (3) the stable stage, where low-carbon housing can be successfully implemented and a qualitative leap is achieved when a certain threshold proportion of real estate developers and homebuyers adopt low-carbon strategies. Additionally, the boundary conditions for each of these three stages were determined using the constructed model.