ORIGINAL RESEARCH article
Front. Public Health
Sec. Environmental Health and Exposome
Volume 13 - 2025 | doi: 10.3389/fpubh.2025.1575121
Study on the Behavioral Decision of Multiple Subjects of Agricultural Green Production under the Double Carbon Target in China
Provisionally accepted- 1School of Accounting, Harbin Finance University, Harbin, China
- 2Research Center of Digital Economy and New Quality Productivity, Harbin Finance University, Harbin, China
- 3School of Information Engineering, Heilongjiang Forestry Vocational-Technical College, Mudanjiang, China
- 4College of Engineering, Northeast Agricultural University, Harbin, Heilongjiang Province, China
- 5School of Management,Trinity Western University, Langley, British Columbia, Canada
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Excessive carbon emissions constitute a major driver of contemporary global warming.Achieving carbon neutrality in agriculture, particularly via carbon peaking, represents a critical strategy for emission reduction, wherein green agricultural production serves as a pivotal component.This study constructs a unified model encompassing the government, agricultural enterprises, and farms engaged in green agricultural production, utilizing a dynamic evolutionary game approach to examine the decision-making behaviors of these stakeholders. The findings indicate that green agricultural production entails the responsibilities of managers, users, and producers. The government fulfills a guiding and supervisory role, while agricultural enterprises actively produce low-carbon agricultural materials, and farms rigorously implement these materials. To facilitate this, the government should implement a reward and punishment mechanism, including increased carbon tax rebates for enterprises producing low-carbon materials and subsidies for farms utilizing them.Conversely, penalties should be levied on entities that fail to comply with low-carbon practices. The government must meticulously calibrate subsidies and fines within a reasonable range, appropriately reduce taxes, and effectively manage regulatory costs to mitigate financial strain. Under government incentives and penalties, agricultural enterprises should proactively respond by offering price concessions to farms utilizing low-carbon materials, balancing costs and benefits, and fostering a socially responsible corporate image. Farms should establish close collaboration with the government and enterprises to ensure the procurement, utilization, and production of low-carbon agricultural materials. This study provides valuable insights for advancing agricultural carbon neutrality through the perspective of green agricultural production.
Keywords: Dual Carbon Targets, agricultural carbon peaking and carbon neutrality, Agricultural green production, Behavioral decision making, evolutionary game
Received: 11 Feb 2025; Accepted: 30 Jun 2025.
Copyright: © 2025 Zhang, Duan, Zhou, Pang, Duan, Teng and Xu. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
* Correspondence:
Yun Teng, College of Engineering, Northeast Agricultural University, Harbin, Heilongjiang Province, China
Hui Xu, School of Management,Trinity Western University, Langley, British Columbia, Canada
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