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ORIGINAL RESEARCH article

Front. Public Health

Sec. Health Economics

Volume 13 - 2025 | doi: 10.3389/fpubh.2025.1638346

Impact of Hospital Payment Reform on Rational Use of Antibiotics: A natural experiment

Provisionally accepted
Kun  ZouKun Zou1,2Xiaofan  PengXiaofan Peng3*Yue  HuangYue Huang4Jin-Min  ShiJin-Min Shi5Zhong-Cheng  HeZhong-Cheng He6Yi-Jia  HaoYi-Jia Hao3Chaojie  LiuChaojie Liu7Yong  TangYong Tang4Shaoyang  ZhaoShaoyang Zhao4Yong-Mu  JiangYong-Mu Jiang4Imti  ChoonaraImti Choonara8Lingli  ZhangLingli Zhang1,2,9
  • 1Sichuan University West China Second University Hospital Department of Pharmacy, Chengdu, China
  • 2Sichuan University West China Second University Hospital Sichuan Provincial Key Laboratory of Development and Women and Children's Diseases, Chengdu, China
  • 3Sichuan University West China School of Public Health, Chengdu, China
  • 4Sichuan University, Chengdu, China
  • 5Wuhan University Economics and Management School, Wuhan, China
  • 6Guangyuan Human Resources and Social Security Bureau, Guangyuan, Sichuan Province, China, Guangyuan, China
  • 7La Trobe University School of Psychology and Public Health, Melbourne, Australia
  • 8University of Nottingham School of Medicine, Nottingham, United Kingdom
  • 9West China Hospital of Sichuan University Chinese Evidence-based Medicine Center, Chengdu, China

The final, formatted version of the article will be published soon.

While numerous studies have examined the effects of diagnosis-related groups (DRG) payment on hospital healthcare, evidence regarding its impact on the quality of hospital healthcare is poor and findings have been inconsistent. This study evaluates how DRG payment reform influences rational use of antibiotics in hospital using the World Health Organization (WHO) Access, Watch, Reserve (AWaRe) classification in China. We employed a natural experiment design with difference-in-differences analysis, comparing 10 hospitals implementing DRG payment in two pilot cities with 27 hospitals maintaining fee-for-service (FFS) payment in three control cities in Sichuan Province. Using medicine consumption data from 2016-2020 (185 hospital-years), we assessed total antibiotic use/expenditure, Access/Watch group proportions, and Access-to-Watch ratios. Compared with FFS payment, DRGs payment had no significant impact on the total quantity or expenditure of antibiotic use. However, DRGs payment led to -13.01% (95% CI: -25.32% to - 0.70%) reduction of proportion of Access antibiotics use and 13.90% (95% CI: 1.97% to 25.83%) increase of proportion Watch antibiotics use. Subgroup analysis showed similar results in both secondary and tertiary hospitals, but greater in the former. DRGs hospital payment reform may not affect the total quantity or expenditure of antibiotics use, but decrease the proportion of WHO Access antibiotics use and increase the Watch antibiotics use. Close monitoring and interventions are warranted to improve rational use of antibiotics for health systems during hospital payment reform.

Keywords: WHO AWaRe Classification, Rational use of antibiotics, Hospital payment reform, Natural experiment, DRG payment

Received: 19 Jun 2025; Accepted: 18 Aug 2025.

Copyright: © 2025 Zou, Peng, Huang, Shi, He, Hao, Liu, Tang, Zhao, Jiang, Choonara and Zhang. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.

* Correspondence: Xiaofan Peng, Sichuan University West China School of Public Health, Chengdu, China

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