Reacting to the entry of green manufacturers: A perspective from ordinary manufacturers

Abstract

More and more green manufacturers are entering the market, which poses a challenge to ordinary manufacturers as to whether they must produce environmental products. Motivated by competition between green manufacturers and ordinary manufacturers, this study examines how an ordinary manufacturer that produces a traditional product (product 1) adapts its product portfolio to compete with a new-entrant green manufacturer. The sale period is divided into two periods. In period 1, the green manufacturer enters the market and provides one green product (product 2). Subsequently, the ordinary manufacturer decides whether to develop a green product (product 3) in period 2. The products are differentiated in two characteristics: traditional quality and environmental quality. We derive the demand function by comparing the consumer utility obtained from the three products. Then, we investigate the ordinary and green manufacturers’ optimal decisions using game theory. Furthermore, we study how government subsidy of green products affects the two manufacturers’ decisions. Finally, we extend our model to discuss the market position of the two green produc2ts when the green technology level is fixed for two manufacturers. Our study suggests that 1) the ordinary manufacturer may not introduce the green product when the difference in environmental quality between two green products is much larger; 2) government subsidy is effective in stimulating the ordinary manufacturer to introduce green product, especially when the traditional manufacturer could provide high-environmental-quality product; and 3) the manufacturer’s green technology level and green technology maturity, and consumers’ willingness to pay for traditional quality, together affect product position.

Introduction

Green products with environmental technology development have recently captured the interest of the public and private sectors. With the rise in consumers’ environmental awareness, manufacturers that only produce environmentally friendly products (for example, Tesla) are entering the market, imposing high competitive pressure and eroding the market share of ordinary manufacturers that often only produce traditional products without much environmental consideration. For ordinary manufacturers (incumbent manufacturers), one strategy is to use pricing to compete with the entrant. In some cases, the incumbent may introduce new products with environmentally friendly design to compete with the entrant. For example, traditional car makers such as Nissan, General Motors, and Chevy Volt have introduced electric or hybrid cars to capture the markets in search of higher profit (Cohen et al., 2015).

We consider a competition problem between two manufacturers: manufacturer 2 (the entrant and the green product’s producer) sets the price for its green product (product 2) and enters into the market. The incumbent firm (ordinary manufacturer/manufacturer 1) provides traditional product (product 1) for consumers in the market and decides whether to introduce a new version of product (product 3) to compete with the entrant. We assume that each product has two basic attributes: the traditional attribute/quality and the environmental attribute/quality. We assume that the three products’ traditional attributes are the same: first, we study the optimal prices of products 2 and 3, considering product competition. We also present the incumbent firm’s optimal product strategy using simulation; then, we analyze the effects of government subsidy of green products on the strategies of manufacturers 1 and 2. Considering the three products’ different traditional and environmental attributes, we first study the optimal traditional quality and price of product 2 and discuss products 2’s optimal market positioning; then, we explore product 3’s traditional quality and price when manufacturer 1 decides to produce green product, and we discuss product 3’s optimal market position. We obtain several interesting conclusions: when the three products have the same traditional quality, then 1) the ordinary manufacturer may not introduce green product when the difference in environmental quality between two green products is much larger; 2) government subsidy could encourage the ordinary manufacturer to produce green product, and the subsidy would be more effective in incentivizing the ordinary manufacturer to produce green product if the ordinary manufacturer could produce higher-environmental-quality product; and 3) product 2’s market position is determined by the environmental quality of product 2, the green cost coefficient, and consumers’ willingness to pay for traditional quality, while product 3’s market position is determined by the green cost coefficient and product 3’s environmental quality.

The contribution of the paper is threefold. First, few articles have studied how ordinary manufacturers respond to the entry of green manufacturers (Benthem et al., 2008; Lobel and Perakis, 2011; Alizamir et al., 2016). However, it is meaningful to explore how ordinary manufacturers react to green manufacturers, especially when there are more and more green manufacturers entering the market. Second, most studies (Zhang et al., 2015; Zhu and He, 2016; Li et al., 2020; Liu et al., 2021) of green products have focused on the environmental quality (e.g., the carbon emission of a vehicle) of green products but neglected the traditional quality (e.g., the safety of the electric vehicle) of the product. However, traditional quality is often the first factor to be considered by the consumer, especially when the traditional quality of the green product is worse than that of the ordinary product. Third, studies of market entry have mainly focused on the optimal pricing and entry times (Klastorin and Tsai, 2004; Schmidt and Druehl, 2005; Alptekinoglu and Corbett, 2008; Seref et al., 2016) but have not considered quality differences between two products. In fact, the entrant’s product and the incumbent’s product are always different. In this study, we extend prior research by considering that the entrant’s and the incumbent’s products are distinct in two aspects, namely, their traditional and environmental qualities, and we discuss products’ market positioning problem.

This paper is organized as follows. The Literature review section gives the related literature. The Model description and analysis section presents products’ optimal prices and manufacturer 1’s product strategy (introducing or not introducing green product). The Government subsidy section illustrates how the government subsidy affects the manufacturers’ decisions. The Extension section extends the model to a scenario in which the three products are different in traditional quality and gives the optimal product position of the green products. The Discussion section discusses the main results. The Conclusion and future research section concludes the paper. All proofs are relegated to Appendix A.

Literature review

There are two streams of research directly related to our study. The first stream investigates how to determine the environmental quality and the price of green products and the impact of government policy on manufacturers’ strategies. The environmental quality of the product includes the clean-up level, emission level, and eco-labeling. Chen (2001) examined how to design the traditional and environmental quality and price of both green and traditional products to maximize profit and found that green product development and stricter environmental standards might not necessarily benefit the environment. Amacher et al. (2004) investigated how to set green technology investment (eco-labeling) to maximize the manufacturer’s profit, and they showed that socially optimal investment for both firms is always positive but is lower than in the duopoly solution. Su et al. (2012) detailed how Zero-Sum and Synergy technology impact the market structure strategy for green products and indicated that to increase total green quality, investing in technology improvement to enable Synergy is more effective than introducing more products. Liu et al. (2012) showed how to set environmental quality with retailer and manufacturer competition. Yang et al. (2020) studied the equilibrium solutions that two enterprises can achieve in terms of technical strategies and analyzed the effect of government subsidies, concluding that government subsidy is conducive to expanding the green product market and improving social welfare. Işık et al. (2021) investigated the convergence of per capita ecological footprints. Tirkolaee et al. (2021) proposed an integrated decision-making approach for green supplier selection to provide products with lower prices and higher quality. Isik et al. (2021) investigated the validity of the environmental Kuznets curve hypothesis for eight OECD countries. Goli et al. (2020) aimed to minimize the related costs and total CO2 emissions and to maximize social responsibility, considering lead time for the production and delivery of perishable products. They showed that the novel hybrid algorithm provides Pareto solutions with acceptable quality and diversity. Lotfi et al. (2022) investigated the time–cost–quality–energy–environment problem in executing projects with resource constraints.

With the government policy (e.g., environmental standard, subsidy and tax policy), Bansal and Gangopadhyay (2003) investigated a policy of discriminatory subsidy and concluded that it improves welfare and also mitigates total pollution; they concluded that a policy of discriminatory subsidy is welfare-improving and also mitigates total pollution. Lombardini-Riipinen (2005) investigated how governments set socially optimal emissions and commodity tax policy and showed that when firms compete in environmental quality, a combination of a uniform ad valorem tax and an emission tax can induce the social optimum. Yakita and Yamauchi (2011) explored how the environmental R&D strategies of firms in symmetric equilibrium affect levels of social welfare and found that the degree of product differentiation is positively correlated with social welfare. Alizamir et al. (2016) analyzed how the government sets electricity purchasing prices using a feed-in tariff policy with renewable energy technologies. They characterized a no-delay region in the problem’s parameters, such that the profitability index should strictly decrease over time if the diffusion and learning rates belong to this region. Raz and Ovchinnikov (2015) presented a stylized framework for analyzing the design of government incentives for public-interest goods. Işık et al. (2022) investigated optimal government spending levels considering the environment and GDP. Cohen et al. (2015) studied government subsidies for the green technology adoption price-setting newsvendor model and showed that when policymakers such as governments ignore demand uncertainty when designing consumer subsidies, they can significantly miss the desired adoption target level. Hong et al. (2021) examined the impact of corporate subsidy and consumer subsidy policies on a market comprising two vertically differentiated products: green products and low-green products. They found that subsidy for firm policy is capable of inducing a higher level of green product adoption than subsidy for consumer policy. Işık et al. (2020) explored the efficacy and the impact of the economic policy uncertainty index in predicting the tourism demand on international tourist arrivals. Chen et al. (2022) developed a differential game-based model to explore optimal production and subsidy rates considering the different objectives of maximizing government social welfare and maximizing government utility.

However, most of the literature has only employed environmental quality in differentiating products and has focused on how to set green products’ environmental quality and prices and on the impact of government policy; they have not considered competition between ordinary and green manufacturers. In this article, we distinguish green product and ordinary product in two aspects: traditional quality and environmental quality. This is in line with reality because the traditional quality of some environmental products is lower than that of ordinary products. We also explore whether the ordinary manufacturer must adjust their product strategy to compete with the green manufacturer. The second stream of relevant literature, accordingly, includes papers that analyze problems related to entry model with price competition. Alptekinoglu and Corbett (2008) studied competition between two multi-product firms with distinct production technologies in a market where customers have heterogeneous preferences on a single-taste attribute and found that an MP facing competition from an MC offers lower product variety than does an MP monopolist to reduce the intensity of price competition. Plambeck and Wang (2009) investigated how two manufacturers determine the prices of old and new products, when there is e-waste regulation of new product introduction, in a stylized model of the electronics industry, and showed that a fee upon sale would increase manufacturers’ profit. Koca et al. (2010) studied product rollover strategy decisions, in which a firm decides whether to phase out an old generation of a product to replace it with a new generation, with either a dual or single roll; they concluded that lower market risk and higher performance improvement for the new generation are associated with the single roll strategy. Su and Rao (2011) studied the timing of new product pre-announcement and launch when two firms compete in the same market and showed that anticipated competitor’s timing choices are the most significant factors. Rubel (2013) studied how firms price new products when they do not know the timing, nor the nature, of the next competitive entry and demonstrated that the randomness of competitive entries makes forward-looking managers choose constant prices. Seref et al. (2016) investigated optimal timing and dynamic pricing when one manufacturer plans to introduce a stream of new products into the marketplace and found that in the single-product rollover case, when price effects dominate diffusion effects, a single-generation solution is optimal. Wang et al. (2016) analyzed the role of pricing and branding in an incumbent firm’s decision when facing competition from an entrant firm with limited capacity; they showed that the incumbent may even increase its price and successfully deter entry by investing in consumers’ preferences for its product. Yu (2018) developed a game theory model to examine the role of green consumerism in competition by combining green and brown products and concluded that enlarging the size of the green customer group may result in a loss–loss situation for manufacturers. Hafezalkotob (2018) established a set of green and non-green production competition models to investigate the balance between green and non-green product types under different modes of government intervention. Hong et al. (2018) investigated green product pricing issues by considering consumer environmental awareness and non-green product references. The results showed that differential pricing strategies should be adopted, facing consumers with differential purchasing behaviors. Hafezalkotob (2018) discussed direct and indirect schemes of government intervention in the competition between green and non-green supply chains and concluded that when choosing an appropriate schema, the corresponding effects on the stakeholders should be considered. Li et al. (2021) investigated a manufacturer’s encroachment decision in a dual-channel supply chain with two differentiated green products and stated that for the green manufacturer, the encroachment strategy can outperform the no-encroachment strategy in terms of profitability, social welfare, and environmental performance. Hua et al. (2022) developed two pricing models to address competition between green and non-green products. Işık (2013) examined the importance of creating a competitive advantage in terms of economies.

The aforementioned literature mainly discussed products’ price competition between green and traditional manufacturers and the optimal time of entering the market, but most of them neglected differences in product quality. In this paper, we not only study price competition among products that have different environmental and traditional qualities but also discuss products’ marketing position problems and the impact of government policy on firms’ strategies. We summarize the most relevant papers in Table 1.

Model description and analysis

In this section, we first present descriptions of the manufacturers, products, and demand functions and then explore optimal strategies for the ordinary and green manufacturers. We designate the incumbent firm (i.e., the ordinary manufacturer) as manufacturer 1 and the entry firm (i.e., the green manufacturer) as manufacturer 2. Manufacturer 1 provides ordinary product (named product 1) and manufacturer 2 provides green product (named product 2) in the marketplace.

Model description

Manufacturer

We consider a green manufacturer as an entrant to the market when there is already an ordinary manufacturer in the marketplace. The green and ordinary manufacturers are competitors. The ordinary manufacturer produces one product: an ordinary product without any environmental characteristics. The green manufacturer provides a green product. As a new entrant, the green manufacturer must determine what kind of green product will meet consumer demand and compete with the ordinary product. In other words, the green manufacturer must determine the environmental quality and price of the green product. Then, with the competition, manufacturer 1 will determine to whether to introduce green product (named product 3) to capture more market share.

Product

We assume that each product has two attributes, traditional and environmental, for which individuals may express quantifiable preferences. Given the assumption that both attributes behave as “qualities” (i.e., consumers who value each attribute prefer higher levels to lower levels on the attribute), we refer to them as “traditional” and “environmental” qualities (denoted by q_t and q_e and ) (Chen, 2001). For example, q_t and q_e could represent the durability and the carbon emission of one product. We assume that the environmental quality of product 1 is zero (), and in this section we focus on environmental quality. Hence, we give the following assumption.

Cost structure

We assume that the variable cost of offering an attribute is a quadratic function, , where c_i (i = e or t) is a variable-cost coefficient of an attribute. Unlike Chen (2001) and Kim et al. (2013), we introduce the fixed cost , where F_t and F_e are fixed-cost coefficients of traditional and environmental quality. The fixed cost of offering an attribute is convex in quality; thus, it is increasingly costly to offer better quality.

Consumer

The variables v_t and v_e denote the positive marginal valuations of traditional and environmental qualities. We assume that consumers have the same valuation of traditional quality v_t but have different valuations of environmental quality v_e. We assume that v_e is uniformly distributed over the interval [0,1]. A consumer buys one unit of the good from one of the two firms or does not buy at all, depending on the utility, , they obtained when purchasing the product, where p is the product’s retail price. We present the main symbols’ meanings in Table 2.

Model analysis

The ordinary manufacturer sells the traditional product 1 in the market. We assume that there are two periods: in period 1, the green manufacturer enters the market and determines price of green product (product 2), . In period 2, the ordinary manufacturer that owns one ordinary product (product 1) must determine whether to produce green product (product 3) and, if so, its price. We assume the ordinary manufacturer to be the leader and the green manufacturer the follower, and we apply the backward method to solve the Stackelberg game problem. First, we solve the green manufacturer’s profit function under the condition that the manufacturer’s decision is given. Then, we solve the optimal response function of the ordinary manufacturer after the solution to the follower’s profit function is derived.

Ordinary manufacturer does not introduce green product

In this scenario, there are two products: product 1 and product 2. A consumer purchases product 2 if and only if they will obtain more utility compared with that of product 1, that is, if it satisfies following conditions:

The first constraint condition is the self-selection constraint imposed to ensure that the customer chooses product 2, which provides them with higher utility. The second constraint is the participation constraint imposed to make sure that the utility derived from the product is non-negative.

Ordinary manufacturer introduces green product

In this subsection, we explore the scenario in which manufacturer 1 introduces green product (product 3) in period 2. Manufacturer 1 may introduce green product with lower or higher environmental quality. We denote the environmental quality and price of product 3 as . Next, we discuss manufacturer 1’s and manufacturer 2’s optimal decisions.

FIGURE 1

Government subsidy

To stimulate manufacturers to produce environmental product, governments always provide subsidy for green product. Therefore, in this subsection, we consider changes in the optimal solutions for manufacturers 1 and 2 with subsidy and provide some suggestions for government subsidy.

We assume that a consumer who purchases green product could obtain total subsidy S and that the subsidy is related to the environmental quality of the green product. Similar to Zhou and Huang (2016), we assume that , where if and if ; s is the subsidy coefficient; and is the environmental quality’s lowest bound if the product could obtain subsidy. From the expression of the government subsidy, we can find that once the environmental quality of the product is larger than the lowest bound, then the more the green, the more the subsidy. Next, as in the Model description and analysis section with the subsidy, we first discuss the scenario in which the ordinary manufacturer only produces traditional product and then present the case in which the ordinary manufacturer also provides green product.

With subsidy-ordinary manufacturer does not introduce green product

Similar to the Model description subsection, consumers purchase ordinary product whenConsumers purchase green product whenHence, the demand function of product 1 is , and the demand function of product 2 is .

Therefore, manufacturer 2’s objective function is

With subsidy-ordinary manufacturer introduces green product

In this subsection, we discuss the case in which manufacturer 1 provides green product. Manufacturer 1 may produce product 3 with lower environmental quality or higher environmental quality.

As in the Model analysis subsection, when , with government subsidy, then manufacturer 2’s and manufacturer 1’s objective functions are as follows:When manufacturer 1 introduces green product with higher environmental quality, that is, , with government subsidy, then manufacturer 2’s and manufacturer 1’s objective functions are as follows:

FIGURE 2

Extension

In the Model description and analysis section and the Discussion section, we discuss two manufacturers’ strategies when manufacturers 1 and 2 provide green products whose traditional quality is the same as product 1’s traditional quality, that is, . But in fact, there exists a difference in traditional quality between ordinary product and green product. For example, if the maximum mileage of an EV is 200 miles, it could satisfy consumers who only need short distance but could not satisfy consumers who need it for long trips when charge stations are not as convenient as gas stations. Thus, the traditional quality of EVs is not as good as for ordinary fuel vehicles (Eberle and Helmolt, 2010). From the consumer’s perspective, the consumer must determine which product to purchase when the green product’s traditional quality is less than that of the ordinary product. Considering the difference between the green product and the ordinary product, in this section we explore the manufacturer’s optimal decisions when the manufacturer also needs to consider traditional quality in their determinations.

Assume that the green technology levels of manufacturers 1 and 2 are given and that the green manufacturer could produce much greener product than the ordinary manufacturer, that is, . In this section, we first present the green manufacturer’s optimal strategy in period 1 when they observe the ordinary product’s quality and price, then give product 2’s market position by comparing the relative differences in traditional and green qualities of products 1 and 2 in the marketplace. Furthermore, we present the green and ordinary manufacturers’ optimal strategies when the ordinary manufacturer introduces green product, and we give product 3’s position in the marketplace.

Taking products 1 and 2 as examples, we denote that product 2 (product 1) is a high-end (low end) product if ; ; product 2 (product 1) is a preference product if and ; and product 2 (product 1) is a low-end (high-end) product if and .

Competition between product 1 and product 2

In this subsection, we discuss the scenario in which manufacturer 1 only provides ordinary product.

Unlike in the Model description subsection, manufacturer 2 needs determine product 2’s traditional quality and price. As in the Model description subsection, considering consumers’ demand function, we can give manufacturer 2’s profit function:

Competition between products 1, 2, and 3

In this subsection, we discuss the scenario in which manufacturer 1 introduces product 3 to the market after manufacturer 2 has entered the market. Considering the reality, product 2 (produced by manufacturer 2, which specializes in producing green product) has higher environmental quality level than product 3, which is provided by ordinary manufacturer 1. Hence, in this subsection we assume that and mainly explore product 3’s traditional quality and price.

As in the Model analysis subsection, manufacturer 2’s profit function isManufacturer 1’s profit function is

Discussion

Conclusion and future research

In this paper, we considered two manufacturers, namely, an ordinary manufacturer and a green manufacturer, competing in two periods. In period 1, there exists an ordinary manufacturer producing traditional product in the market, and a green manufacturer providing the green product enters the market; in period 2, the ordinary manufacturer determines whether to introduce green product to compete with the entrant. First, we focus on green manufacturer pricing of product 2 and whether the incumbent manufacturer introduces and, if they introduce, what type of green product they should provide. Second, we study the effect of the government subsidy on manufacturers’ decisions. Finally, we extend our model to discuss product 2’s and product 3’s optimal market positioning.

The main findings are as follows: 1) manufacturer 1 will not introduce the green product when the difference in environmental quality between the two green products is much larger; 2) the government subsidy is effective in stimulating the ordinary manufacturer to introduce green product, especially in the context of uncertainty and COVID, and the subsidy will be more efficient if the ordinary manufacturer can provide high-environmental-quality product; 3) the manufacturer’s green technology level, the green technology maturity, and consumers’ willingness to pay for traditional quality affect the product’s market positioning. We present product 2’s and product 3’s optimal market positions in period 1 and 2.

Our model could be extended in numerous ways. For example, manufacturers always need to determine when to introduce new products; hence, the introduction timing is an area for further research. In addition, if the manufacturer could produce the product with any environmental quality level, then they must determine what kind of green product they should provide; therefore, optimal environmental quality should be considered in future research.

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