ORIGINAL RESEARCH article
Front. Phys.
Sec. Social Physics
Volume 13 - 2025 | doi: 10.3389/fphy.2025.1611590
This article is part of the Research TopicReal-World Applications of Game Theory and Optimization, Volume IIIView all 3 articles
Research on Interaction Mechanism between Cross-regional Operating Enterprises and Local Government: Perspective Based on Evolutionary Game
Provisionally accepted
- 1Commercial Factoring (Shanghai) Co., Yunnan Communications Investment and Construction Group Co.Ltd, Kunming, China
- 2Jiangsu University, Zhenjiang, China
- 3School of Accounting, Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics Dongfang College, Hangzhou, China
- 4Shanghai Lixin University of Accounting and Finance, Shanghai, China
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Under the background of unified national market, the interaction between cross-regional operating enterprises and local government not only involves factors such as investment scale, policy preferences and industrial collaborate, but also has a profound impact on the innovation activities of enterprises and the improvement of regional innovation ecosystems. This study employs evolutionary game theory to construct a bilateral game model, thereby elucidating the dynamic game-theoretic relationships between cross-regional operating enterprises and cross-entry local governments. It is found that the establishment of interest interaction and government-enterprise gaming mechanisms can effectively promote the two sides from short-term gaming to stable cooperation and reduce strategic uncertainty.The aim is to explore in depth how cross-regiona operation can further promote the improvement of innovation performance and even the highquality development of enterprises through the strategic interaction with the governments of cross-regional places.
Keywords: cross-regional operation, Local Government, evolutionary game theory, Innovation ecosystem, Knowledge spillover Frontiers
Received: 14 Apr 2025; Accepted: 28 Apr 2025.
Copyright: © 2025 Zhao, LI, Zhang and Zhang. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
* Correspondence: SHUQI LI, Jiangsu University, Zhenjiang, China
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