ORIGINAL RESEARCH article
Front. Phys.
Sec. Social Physics
Volume 13 - 2025 | doi: 10.3389/fphy.2025.1625934
This article is part of the Research TopicFinance and Production Complex SystemsView all 19 articles
Blockchain-Driven Logistics Provider Guaranteed Financing Balance Strategies Considering Risk Aversion
Provisionally accepted
Lei Yang*
Qiaoming Hou*- Shenyang University of Technology, Shenyang, China
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Addressing the financial constraints for suppliers, this study employs game theory analysis to construct a guarantee financing model under blockchain technology where logistics providers offer guarantees to suppliers. It considers the risk-averse of managers and first analyzes the financing equilibrium strategies before and after blockchain in a non-cooperative game setting. Then, under a cooperative game framework, it explores the financing equilibrium strategies in three modes: cooperation between suppliers and logistics providers, cooperation between logistics providers and e-commerce platforms, and cooperation among all three parties. It also compares and analyzes the influence of blockchain on cooperative and non-cooperative game strategies in terms of financing decisions. To coordinate the interest conflicts among various risk-averse members, the study introduces revenue-sharing and costsharing to formulate coordination strategies. Through comparative analysis, it is found that information verification costs can impair the financing gains of suppliers but help ensure the financing gains of logistics providers. Supplier defaults are detrimental to the development of supply chain financing (SCF). The financing gains of suppliers and logistics providers will initially decrease and then increase with the adoption of blockchain, which can better optimize financing strategies once they exceed a certain threshold. A higher risk aversion can harm the financing gains of suppliers and logistics providers but benefit the gains of e-commerce platforms and financial institutions. Compared to noncooperative modes, cooperative models are more effective in enhancing the financing efficiency, and under cooperative modes, blockchain is more conducive to promoting the improvement of corporate financing gains. The Shapley value can effectively allocate the financing gains among supply chain members, and risk-sharing contracts can increase the financing gains of suppliers and logistics providers. This research aims to provide theoretical references for the financing decisions of supply chain enterprises.
Keywords: Blockchain, risk aversion, Supply chain financing, Financing Equilibrium, Strategy Optimization
Received: 09 May 2025; Accepted: 14 Jul 2025.
Copyright: © 2025 Yang and Hou. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
* Correspondence:
Lei Yang, Shenyang University of Technology, Shenyang, China
Qiaoming Hou, Shenyang University of Technology, Shenyang, China
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