ORIGINAL RESEARCH article
Front. Phys.
Sec. Social Physics
Volume 13 - 2025 | doi: 10.3389/fphy.2025.1629665
This article is part of the Research TopicReal-World Applications of Game Theory and Optimization, Volume IIIView all 5 articles
Collusion strategies of container shipping chain under supervision based on tripartite evolutionary game
Provisionally accepted
- 1College of International Economics & Trade, Ningbo University of Finance & Economics, Ningbo, China
- 2Planning and Academic Office, Zhejiang Wanli University, Ningbo, China
- 3College of Foreign Languages, Shanghai Jianqiao University, Shanghai, China
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As over 80% of global trade relies on maritime transport, and container shipping accounts for more than 90% of the total value of maritime trade. The research on collusion strategies in a monitored container transport chain based on a tripartite evolutionary game, which this paper tackles, is a very interesting topic as an application of game theory. In today's world where global supply chains are becoming more complex, understanding the strategic interactions between the parties involved in container transport (shippers, carriers, port operators, etc.) is an essential task for improving logistics efficiency and realizing a fair competitive environment. This study investigates the strategic interactions among container terminals, liner enterprises, and Port Authorities under regulatory supervision, revealing two critical regimes. Firstly, when fines fall below regulatory costs, collusion persists despite lax supervision, stabilizing the system at a suboptimal equilibrium regardless of penalty-subsidy combinations. Secondly, when fines exceed costs, an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) emerges if the total penalty-subsidy value undercuts collusion profits; otherwise, cyclical instability occurs as regulators oscillate between enforcement and relaxation due to fiscal constraints. Numerical simulations validate these dynamics, demonstrating how cost-profit thresholds govern strategic outcomes. Using a tripartite evolutionary game model and numerical simulations, we demonstrate how cost-profit thresholds govern these strategic outcomes. Our findings highlight the necessity of designing penalty structures that simultaneously ensure regulatory cost recovery and neutralize collusion incentives, providing actionable insights for maritime policymakers to balance deterrence effectiveness with enforcement sustainability in container shipping markets.
Keywords: Container shipping industry, evolutionary game theory, port authority, liner enterprise, strict supervision
Received: 16 May 2025; Accepted: 16 Jul 2025.
Copyright: © 2025 Liu, Xu, Gao and Li. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
* Correspondence: Zongtuan Liu, College of International Economics & Trade, Ningbo University of Finance & Economics, Ningbo, China
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