Editorial for the I Animal Consciousness Volume

Matteo Laurenzi^1*Antonino Raffone¹Günter Ehret²

• ¹Sapienza University of Rome, Rome, Italy
• ²Institute of Neurobiology, University of Ulm, Ulm, Germany

The study of animal consciousness has gained new prominence, driven by progress in neuroscience, cognitive ethology, and philosophy of mind (e.g., Andrews et al., 2024;Ehret and Romand, 2022;Bayne et al., 2024;Grinde, 2024). This special issue brings together diverse contributions (i.e., empirical, theoretical, and conceptual) that propose new ways to think about the nature and evolution of non-human consciousness.An evolutionary framework sets the stage for approaches in the following papers. In his first article, Lacalli proposes that consciousness and agency, typically seen as coevolving, may have distinct evolutionary origins. He suggests that conscious experience may have preceded the emergence of full individual agency, and outlines three functional levels: conscious sensations, consciously conditioned reflexes (CCRs), and deliberate choices (DCs). While DCs involve memory and intention, CCRs describe intermediate behaviors modulated by conscious input without deliberate control.In his second contribution, Lacalli explores adaptive functions of consciousness, distinguishing general roles (such as behavioral flexibility) from more specific functions related to memory and motivation. He introduces the speculative concept of "species memory," by which qualia could encode ancestral experience, allowing consciousness to shift from moment-to-moment regulation to broader integrative functions across evolutionary time.Kaufmann, in turn, addresses methodological and ethical issues. She contrasts the "markers hypothesis," which seeks discrete indicators of consciousness, with the "universal consciousness hypothesis," which assumes presence unless disproven.Arguing that both carry risks, she advocates for a middle path: a dimensional, speciessensitive model that aligns empirical caution with ethical responsibility.Other articles confront the problem of whether (and how) consciousness can be studied empirically. Irwin proposes a symbolic framework to profile consciousness across species. Avoiding anthropocentric criteria, he develops a behavioral matrix based on volition, interaction, and self-direction, quantified through measurable variables such as frequency and dynamism. Irwin's second article deepens his analysis through gaze-shift patterns in birds and lizards. Noting marked differences in the frequency of attention redirection, he suggests that even simple behaviors like eye movement may illuminate how different animals become aware of their environments. Woodruff offers a bridging perspective through the case of tonic immobility, a defensive behavior widespread among animals. Its initiation appears automatic, its termination, however, is responsive to environmental context, potentially reflecting rudimentary awareness. Without invoking higher cognition, Woodruff cautiously interprets this pattern as consistent with low-level forms of anoetic consciousness.Feinberg proposes a broader biological and evolutionary account of sentience (phenomenal, primary consciousness). His theory of Neurobiological Emergentism holds that subjective experience arises through increasing neurobiological complexity and hierarchical integration. Sentience, on this view, is an emergent property of evolved nervous systems. In contrast to theories rooted in biopsychicism such as Integrated Information Theory, Feinberg reframes the explanatory gap as an "experiential gap" i.e., a natural and expected outcome of biological emergence. Sentience is both personal and physical: first-person in character, yet fully explicable within the framework of evolutionary neuroscience.A final group of contributions expands the conceptual frame of animal consciousness.Laurenzi and colleagues propose that the study of consciousness must reckon with the self not as an afterthought, but as a central, multifaceted phenomenon in its own right.Drawing on the Pattern Theory of Self, they argue that self identity is best understood as a dynamic constellation of bodily, affective, cognitive, and social dimensions. This multidimensional view avoids the binary traps of minimal versus reflective selfawareness, and resists anthropocentric benchmarks like mirror self-recognition.Homberg and colleagues reflect on the tensions between animal and animal-free research. Drawing on their own experiences, they advocate for an ethic of mutual respect, one that recognizes different methodological commitments not as moral oppositions, but as diverse strategies in the shared pursuit of knowledge. They call for open, context-sensitive dialogues, suggesting that the way we communicate about consciousness in animals affects not only public understanding, but also the ethical landscape in which animal research is conducted.This volume marks a clear shift to animal-centered, pluralistic and graded approaches to the evolution of consciousness reflecting biological diversity and epistemic humility.The focus is less on whether animals are conscious at all, on how consciousness may evolve to help animals adapt to their ecological niches and how we should treat animals at their levels of consciousness, both ethically and scientifically adequately. Two shared commitments stand out: a rejection of consciousness as a single trait in favor of a dynamic integration of cognitive, affective, and perceptual processes including their neural backgrounds, and a methodological self-awareness that recognizes the limits of inference and the moral risks of misattribution.Looking ahead, the field calls for integrative methods that may find adequate definitions of animal consciousness, refine behavioral and physiological research tools, build crossspecies models free of anthropocentrism, and embed ethical reflection into research practices. Rather than offering definitive answers, the present essays reflect inquiries that may become important if we are to understand consciousness in its many forms, and in doing so, reconsider our own place in the living world.