Special issue Frontiers in Psychology Phenomenological Psychopathology: Who, What and How?

Susi Ferrarello^1*Valeria Bizzari²Francesca Brencio³Magnus Englander⁴

• ¹California State University, East Bay, Hayward, United States
• ²Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Leuven, Belgium
• ³University of Birmingham, Birmingham, United Kingdom
• ⁴Malmo universitet, Malmö, Sweden

dominant role of cognitive-behavioral therapy within mainstream psychology is grounded in a theoretical model of the psyche that seems like a mere epiphenomenon of the biomedical model.Psychiatry appears to follow the principle of "descriptions, not interpretations, which guided the Kraepelinian model. This approach tends to dismiss any alternative viewpoints as unscientific or lacking evidence. The field generally treats mental illnesses as concrete, physical things (a process called reification), rather than as complex psychological and cultural experiences. This leads to an oversimplified view that our mental lives can be completely explained by brain structure and chemistry."It seems as if the further neurology advances, the further the psyche recedes; psychopathology (…) explores the psyche to the limits of consciousness but finds at these limits no somatic process directly associated with such phenomena as delusional ideas, spontaneous affects and hallucinations" (Jaspers, 1997, p. 4).In terms of historical significance, the clinical psychologist has been seen as having less status within the mental health context compared to the psychiatrist representing the medical doctor.Compared to the psychologist only being able to conduct psychotherapy, the psychiatrist has been able to do both psychotherapy and to prescribe medication. Lately, however, the continuous efforts of recovery-oriented psychiatry, social psychiatry, and community psychiatry have been able to revert the public eye toward the importance of interpersonal relationship and sociality regarding psychiatric issues and problems (Englander 2018, Ferrarello 2021, Brencio 2024).For this special issue in Frontiers of Psychology, we have addressed the historical and philosophical problems related to the subdiscipline called, Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology. As editors of this special issue, we have encouraged contributors to return to a phenomenological approach. The issue, Phenomenological Psychopathology: Who, What and How? includes contributions that have addressed core philosophical issues relevant for the world of psychiatry and psychology. A phenomenological approach appears to be useful also in distinguishing between different forms of depression. It is what is done in the article "I was very sad, but not depressed": phenomenological differences between adjustment disorder and a major depressive episode by Zapata-Ospina et al. A descriptive phenomenological approach is used with in-depth interviews to four patients and the method proposed by Colaizzi to understand the experiences and reach the description of both disorders. While the MDE is described as an intense state of generalized shutdown of the subject's own life, with little response to events, the AD seems to be a dynamic reaction attributed to a stressful event, with high variability in the course of symptoms due to the dependence on such event, with the preserved hope that it will end. A phenomenologically grounded specification of varieties of adolescent depression they show how phenomenology can be helpful to elaborate a fine-grained description of this clinical and experiential condition in that peculiar and difficult phase of life. Their study investigates the association between these types of depression typical of adolescence and the vicissitudes of personality development. In accounts given by youths diagnosed with depression during semistructured interviews, they identify themes and examine their phenomenological centrality.Specifically, thanks to a qualitative analysis they differentiate three specifiers of adolescent depression and suggest an association between types of experiences and the trajectory of affected adolescents' personality development.In examining the self-boundary in psychotic experiences within sociocentric cultures, Taipale's article, Caught on the Surface: Tustin on Autistic Experience, delves into Frances Tustin's theory (1981), suggesting that sensory alterations, especially tactile, lie at the heart of autism. Tustin's work suggests that autistic individuals experience a collapse in experiential depth, which complicates interactions with both the world and others, impacting not only spatial perception but also symbolic and intersubjective connection.In the paper Incels, autism, and hopelessness: affective incorporation of online interaction as a challenge for phenomenological psychopathology, Tirkkonnen and Vespermann analyze the experiential connection between inceldom, self-reported autism, and hopelessness. By combining empirical studies on online incel communities with phenomenological and embodiment approaches on autism, hopelessness, and online affectivity, they analyze three interrelated aspects of online interactions in incel communities -worldview, bodily selfrelation, and mutual dismissals -and examine how these elements contribute to the consolidation of the loss of significant life possibilities. This can shed light on the negative effects of specific online environments on autistic subjects. approach examines a condition which is usually overlooked in phenomenological psychopathology: the "obsessive-compulsive disorder." By combining phenomenology and anthropology, they offer a description of the obsessive-compulsive existential type. They analyze this obsessive-compulsive lifeworld starting from the notion of anti-eidos as a diluting existential force, and they propose to enlarge this notion in its dialectical correlation with eidos (unifying existential force), representing the existential dialectic between transformation and permanence. The use of clinical cases and the theoretical regard lead to a detailed analysis of the different structures of subjectivity (such as temporality, embodiment etc.) in this peculiar condition.Phenomenology is also used in the context of clinical emergency: in their paper entitled Phenomenology of psychiatric emergency, Goretti et al. takes into account life-threatening conditions and they argue that, even if until now neglected by phenomenological psychopathology, the emergency issue faces a clinical management challenge in which the phenomenological method becomes fundamental. The purpose of this manuscript is then to explore the phenomenological perspective of psychiatric emergencies. The manuscript is organized into four sections: the first deals with the encounter in clinical phenomenology, the second with the life-word of the crisis, the third with the atmosphere of emergency; finally, a final section on the importance of the phenomenological method for the clinician. Sabina Wantoch's paper explores the phenomenon of anomalous experience, a term that encompasses what is often labeled as hallucination or, more broadly, the experiential dimensions of psychosis. She critically examines the prevailing clinical view, which frames anomalous experience as a "pathology of the mind," and interrogates how this framing is intersubjectively felt and enacted. Drawing on Matthew Ratcliffe's (2017) account of intersubjectivity in relation to anomalous experience, Wantoch argues that psychiatric conceptualizations may inadvertently disrupt intersubjective processes for individuals undergoing such experiences. The pathologizing framework, she suggests, can shape relational dynamics in affectively charged ways that exclude individuals from shared meaning-making and social reality. Paradoxically, the very psychiatric framework intended to categorize and treat these experiences might also contribute to their emergence and intensification.Wantoch challenges phenomenological psychopathology to reconsider its foundational assumptions, particularly its tendency to adopt psychiatric categories uncritically. She contends that the field must reflect on its own participation in shaping anomalous experience through conceptual and affective pathways. As an alternative, she advocates for beginning with the direct, lived experience of anomalous phenomena rather than with their presumed pathological status. In doing so, she points toward the development of a critical phenomenological psychopathology-one that acknowledges the co-constitutive role of clinical discourse, Together, these works illustrate a broadened understanding of phenomenological approaches to psychopathology, highlighting the role of intersubjective, cultural, and developmental factors across various psychological conditions. They underscore the potential of phenomenology to deepen insights into complex mental health conditions and improve therapeutic practices. When diagnosing and treating mental health conditions, it's important to acknowledge how deeply a person's experiences, relationships, and social interactions shape their psychological development. Understanding mental health requires recognizing the continuous back-and-forth relationship between the brain and a person's environment (Fuchs 2018). There is a crucial difference between describing someone's personal experience and diagnosing a mental disorder. Personal experiences are inherently subjective, while diagnoses require generalized criteria that can reliably predict outcomes. This led to a major shift in the 1980s, when the DSM-III introduced operational definitions. This approach was adopted to help clinicians reach more consistent diagnoses with less room for interpretation. However, while having standardized categories can be useful for grouping similar conditions, the oversimplified operational approach don't capture the full complexity of the experiences that people have in dealing with a psychological condition (Kendler and Parnas, 2012).In editing this special issue our aim is to offer the readers a diverse collection of contributions which crosscuts psychiatry, psychology and philosophy, and that can contribute to nourish a view on human suffering and behaving which cannot be inscribed only and mainly on a biomedical model. If treating and curing remain the priorities of every medical endeavour, understanding is the preliminary step toward these purposes and, as such, it needs to be grounded on a richer and diversified paradigm. In this, Jaspers' words can serve as a compass: "In our view psychic life is an infinite whole, a totality that resists any consistent attempt to systematize it; much like the sea, we may coast along the shore, go far out into the deeps but still only traverse the surface waters. If we try to reduce psychic life to a few universal principles and seek comprehensive laws, we beg a question that cannot be answered. Where our theories may seem to have some kinship with the natural sciences, it is in the forming of tentative hypotheses, which we make for limited research ends only and which have no application to the psyche as a whole" (Jaspers, 1997, p. 17).