About this Research Topic
This Research Topic addresses chemical and biological weapons, their history, and international agreements to control, regulate, and eliminate them. The core of the topic is concerned with toxic chemicals and poison gases, synthetic and biological toxins, and pathogens used as warfare agents. Manuscripts are also sought on biodefense preparedness and accidental release events worldwide.
This collection commemorates the centennial of the Geneva 1925 Protocol. To date, chemical and biological warfare agents, also referred to as invisible weapons of mass destruction, continue to be of concern across political, cultural, and religious boundaries.
Chemical and biological weapons have a long anecdotal and documented history of use in modern war. Their importance and spectra were aligned with advances in chemistry and microbiological discoveries in the 1800s. Early agreements to contain chemical and biological weapons were made in Brussels (1874), Oxford (1880), and The Hague (1899, 1907). WWI saw the first systemic large scale use of chemical weapons (like bromine ethyl acetate and chlorine gas) in history. The Geneva Protocol (1925) was an attempt to restrict and control the use of these warfare agents. Some countries started to mass-produce and stockpile toxic gases and biological agents after WWI. Although they were not used on a large scale in WWII, their stockpiling continued through the 1940s. Moreover, there were documented and alleged uses of chemical and biological weapons in conflicts starting in the 1950s, such as the Korean War, and others that erupted in Asia and elsewhere through the 1960s and 1970s.
The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament convened in Geneva from 1969 resulted in the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the terms of which became effective in 1975. Ratified by 22 nations, the BWC effectively banned all forms of biological and toxin weapons. Similarly, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) of 1997, administered by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), resulted in a treaty that effectively prohibited the production and use of chemical weapons. While both treaties were admirable attempts to ban these types of warfare and weapons, enforcement through inspection and verification have remained problematic. Documented, undocumented, and alleged cases of chemical and biological weapons use have continued to this millennium. Notable shifts since the conclusion of these treaties include the use of these weapons as instruments of terrorism and against individuals or specific groups outside any war situation. Additionally, the use of toxic chemicals or pathogens against farm animals and crop plants is of increasing concern.
Biosecurity and Biodefense are now key issues in many countries in efforts to protect against chemical and biological weapons should they ever be deployed. Emerging technologies, such as synthetic biology and nanotechnology, introduce new dimensions of threats and mitigation strategies that must be understood and controlled.
We welcome manuscript submissions on all aspects of chemical and biological warfare and weapons, including but not limited to:
• Specific examples of gases, toxins, and pathogens and a the
historical analysis of their use as weapons
• Significant developments in the history of international law,
science, and warfare in the last 150 years.
• Country-specific reports on chemical and biological agents and
the underlying policies, R&D, and production.
• Case studies of documented or alleged uses of these weapons.
• Public health, ethical, and social implications.
• Technological advancements in detection and defense against
chemical and biological threats.
• Biodefense preparedness and response strategies.
• The impact of emerging technologies on future threats and
mitigation efforts.
We particularly encourage interdisciplinary collaborations and submissions that provide comprehensive insights into the challenges and solutions associated with chemical and biological weapons.
Upon submission, authors may request the manuscript to be considered in a specific Frontiers journal, which are listed below.
This collection commemorates the centennial of the Geneva 1925 Protocol. To date, chemical and biological warfare agents, also referred to as invisible weapons of mass destruction, continue to be of concern across political, cultural, and religious boundaries.
Chemical and biological weapons have a long anecdotal and documented history of use in modern war. Their importance and spectra were aligned with advances in chemistry and microbiological discoveries in the 1800s. Early agreements to contain chemical and biological weapons were made in Brussels (1874), Oxford (1880), and The Hague (1899, 1907). WWI saw the first systemic large scale use of chemical weapons (like bromine ethyl acetate and chlorine gas) in history. The Geneva Protocol (1925) was an attempt to restrict and control the use of these warfare agents. Some countries started to mass-produce and stockpile toxic gases and biological agents after WWI. Although they were not used on a large scale in WWII, their stockpiling continued through the 1940s. Moreover, there were documented and alleged uses of chemical and biological weapons in conflicts starting in the 1950s, such as the Korean War, and others that erupted in Asia and elsewhere through the 1960s and 1970s.
The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament convened in Geneva from 1969 resulted in the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the terms of which became effective in 1975. Ratified by 22 nations, the BWC effectively banned all forms of biological and toxin weapons. Similarly, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) of 1997, administered by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), resulted in a treaty that effectively prohibited the production and use of chemical weapons. While both treaties were admirable attempts to ban these types of warfare and weapons, enforcement through inspection and verification have remained problematic. Documented, undocumented, and alleged cases of chemical and biological weapons use have continued to this millennium. Notable shifts since the conclusion of these treaties include the use of these weapons as instruments of terrorism and against individuals or specific groups outside any war situation. Additionally, the use of toxic chemicals or pathogens against farm animals and crop plants is of increasing concern.
Biosecurity and Biodefense are now key issues in many countries in efforts to protect against chemical and biological weapons should they ever be deployed. Emerging technologies, such as synthetic biology and nanotechnology, introduce new dimensions of threats and mitigation strategies that must be understood and controlled.
We welcome manuscript submissions on all aspects of chemical and biological warfare and weapons, including but not limited to:
• Specific examples of gases, toxins, and pathogens and a the
historical analysis of their use as weapons
• Significant developments in the history of international law,
science, and warfare in the last 150 years.
• Country-specific reports on chemical and biological agents and
the underlying policies, R&D, and production.
• Case studies of documented or alleged uses of these weapons.
• Public health, ethical, and social implications.
• Technological advancements in detection and defense against
chemical and biological threats.
• Biodefense preparedness and response strategies.
• The impact of emerging technologies on future threats and
mitigation efforts.
We particularly encourage interdisciplinary collaborations and submissions that provide comprehensive insights into the challenges and solutions associated with chemical and biological weapons.
Upon submission, authors may request the manuscript to be considered in a specific Frontiers journal, which are listed below.
Keywords: Toxins, Pathogens, Chemical weapons, Chemical warfare, Biological weapons, Biological warfare, Biosecurity, Geneva Protocol, Geneva Convention
Important Note: All contributions to this Research Topic must be within the scope of the section and journal to which they are submitted, as defined in their mission statements. Frontiers reserves the right to guide an out-of-scope manuscript to a more suitable section or journal at any stage of peer review.
