%A Gomes,Carlos A. %A Mayes,Andrew %D 2015 %J Frontiers in Psychology %C %F %G English %K Repetition Priming,Implicit Memory,object identification,selective-attention,recognition memory,response learning %Q %R 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00270 %W %L %M %P %7 %8 2015-March-20 %9 Original Research %+ Carlos A. Gomes,Human Memory Laboratory, School of Psychological Sciences, University of Manchester,Manchester, UK, %+ Carlos A. Gomes,Department of Psychology, Saarland University, Saarbrücken,Germany, %# %! Priming and object identity at encoding %* %< %T Does long-term object priming depend on the explicit detection of object identity at encoding? %U https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00270 %V 6 %0 JOURNAL ARTICLE %@ 1664-1078 %X It is currently unclear whether objects have to be explicitly identified at encoding for reliable behavioral long-term object priming to occur. We conducted two experiments that investigated long-term object and non-object priming using a selective-attention encoding manipulation that reduces explicit object identification. In Experiment 1, participants either counted dots flashed within an object picture (shallow encoding) or engaged in an animacy task (deep encoding) at study, whereas, at test, they performed an object-decision task. Priming, as measured by reaction times (RTs), was observed for both types of encoding, and was of equivalent magnitude. In Experiment 2, non-object priming (faster RTs for studied relative to unstudied non-objects) was also obtained under the same selective-attention encoding manipulation as in Experiment 1, and the magnitude of the priming effect was equivalent between experiments. In contrast, we observed a linear decrement in recognition memory accuracy across conditions (deep encoding of Experiment 1 > shallow encoding Experiment 1 > shallow encoding of Experiment 2), suggesting that priming was not contaminated by explicit memory strategies. We argue that our results are more consistent with the identification/production framework than the perceptual/conceptual distinction, and we conclude that priming of pictures largely ignored at encoding can be subserved by the automatic retrieval of two types of instances: one at the motor level and another at an object-decision level.