Introduction
“When your views on the world & your intellect are being challenged & you begin to feel uncomfortable because of a contradiction you've detected that is threatening your current model of the world...pay attention. You are about to learn something”
(Drury, 1998, p. 201)
Taking an interdisciplinary perspective on the combined concerns of human and planetary health, this paper will turn to the subjectivity of psychotherapy as an important addition to the understanding and mitigation of psychological and environmental dis-ease. Psychology and psychotherapy, despite having a shared interest in people, generally exist at the opposite ends of a spectrum. Whereas, psychology perpetuates a more scientific and therefore a rather generic understanding of the human condition, psychotherapy attempts to deepen the understanding of the psyche at the individual and particular level. Both perspectives, alongside other important and relevant disciplines (e.g., Education: Bainbridge and Del Negro, 2020; Cybernetics: Bateson and Bateson, 2000), are required to address the environmental and health problems that humanity faces. Indeed, a reductionist undertaking, in any field, culminates in the creation of specialisms which restricts the holism required for adequate problem understanding and solving (Sennett, 2013). The central thesis of this paper is that there is a fostering of an inward, contemplative focus, alongside outward-focussed research, to develop some much-needed self-awareness. The “self” is understood in psychotherapy to be multiple (non-unitary), contextual, and dynamic, which if developed and explored may lead to “moderating engrained responses and […] enhancing our relationships” (Rose, 2012, p. 4; see also Schore, 2010) and potentially leading to more informed decision making.
Much of contemporary psychology and psychological research is inadequate for understanding (and therefore helping) the human condition (Sampson, 1981; Wertz, 1993; Notterman, 2000; Todres, 2003; Toomela, 2008; Dalal, 2018). As one example, there has been over 60 years of research focussed on the health implications of tobacco smoking (e.g., Doll and Hill, 1954). Despite this, it is estimated that tobacco will be responsible for 10 million deaths worldwide by 2025—a doubling of deaths in ~20 years (e.g., Proctor, 2004; World Health Organisation, 2021) making it the second leading global death risk factor (Ritchie and Roser, 2013). Moreover, the role of psychological interventions to prevent smoking has arguably been less than optimal (e.g., Shiffman, 1993; Schlam and Baker, 2013; Jackson et al., 2021). Essentially, affecting behavioral change in the last 60 years for such an important global health issue has been slow. In terms of contemporary psychological and environmental health issues—we simply do not have 60 years.
People don't typically change in any significant ways unless there is a strong personal motivation to do so or, regarding environmental crises, until it's too late (Diamond, 2004; SEI et al., 2021). People will die for their beliefs: Mike Hughes died crash-landing his self-built steam-powered rocket in an attempt to substantiate that the Earth was flat (Washington Post, 2020). In a similar myopic view, the HSBC plans to phase out coal mining financing by 2040 but only if it is cleared by shareholders (BBC, 2021).
Humans are far more than the information processing model espoused by the cognitive analogy derived from the advent of the computer in the 1950s (Beidel and Turner, 1986; Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 1986; Hardcastle, 1995). The human “processor” has far greater complexity and interconnectivity (depth) to it (e.g., Dijksterhuis et al., 2005). Knowledge about environmental issues (and indeed mental health), is by itself generally an “insufficient precondition for successful action” (Frick et al., 2004, p. 1598; see also Hicks and Bord, 2001; Kollmus and Agyeman, 2002; Loughland et al., 2003). For instance, a prominent theory within the social sciences regarding human behaviors, rational choice theory, merely reinforces the idea of what we should do but is “fundamentally deficient as an account of [actual] behavior” (Herrnstein, 1990, p. 356). Similarly, it has been suggested that psychology broaden its scope through multi-disciplinarity and to move beyond overly simplistic descriptions of “events and causes” (Belli et al., 2015, p. 762).
We can “know” that using fossil fuels, having a meat-based diet, working ourselves to an early breakdown, smoke, drink, choose less than suitable partners, etc. all have detrimental effects on our health, the environment (Oishi and Graham, 2010; Koger and Winter, 2011; Londakova et al., 2021) and our psyches (McWilliams, 2011; Jacobs, 2012)—yet we continue to do so. Why these behaviors have not attracted the same level of “pathologizing” that others have is a little confusing. With their obvious detrimental environmental and health related effects, these behaviors are not “rational.” They may be perceived, on the small scale as rather inconsequential (e.g., “it's only a short trip by car to the shops”; “what difference will one bacon sandwich make”; “I (only) have to produce more academic papers”) because they are “normal” and habitual. Take one example of a diagnosable condition—Internet Gaming Disorder (American Psychiatric Association, 2013): “Compulsive, to the exclusion of other interests, and their persistent and recurrent … activity results in clinically significant impairment …People with this condition endanger their academic or job functioning [&] they experience symptoms of withdrawal”. If we consider the criteria of this supposed condition, then why has there not been a Social Media Disorder, Alcohol Drinking Disorder or a Fossil Fuel Addiction Disorder? Furthermore, it has been proposed that if we are to follow a scientific objectivity and the subsequent diagnostic course, then we would have to include happiness as a disorder—major affective disorder, pleasant type (see Bentall, 1992, for a detailed account).
Individuals think little of their own behaviors because they are actively and largely unquestioningly engaging in many collective irrational behaviors daily—even when there is a rational “knowing” that they are detrimental. The uncomfortable conclusion here is that there may be a parallel between what is done normatively and those scientifically accepted diagnosable disorders of the DSM-5 (e.g., Granieri et al., 2017). Therefore, there is an increasing need to challenge the “pathology of normalcy” (Fromm, 1994, p. 27) or habit, or as phrased by Freud: repetition compulsion (Wilson and Malatesta, 1989) and to embrace a different mind-set, one that by its very nature of being “different” will disturb preconceptions. It may be worth taking, with reference to the opening quote, a reflexive account of your own responses and reactions to the presented material thus far.
The problem is that the human species tends to be change averse. This applies as much to you and your chosen academic community as it does to anyone observed in the population. We are just as likely to be dismissive of competing information than anyone else as a form of confirmation bias. Any engagement with alternative viewpoints could lead to uncomfortable dissonance. We are all therefore to some extent, employing various, and largely unconscious strategies, to avoid this uncomfortable state.
The unconscious
“Society has not yet been driven to seek treatment of its psychological disorders by psychological means because it has not achieved sufficient insight to appreciate the nature of its distress”
(Bion, 1961, p. 14)
Ostensibly, psychodynamic theory and the concept of the unconscious is considered obsolete and outdated in much of mainstream psychology, albeit with a small and growing resurgence (Wilson, 2002; Bargh and Morsella, 2008; Bargh, 2014). Within this corpus are examples of research in cognitive, social, developmental and personality psychology, that now supports many Freudian-based propositions including that of the unconscious and various defense mechanisms that would need to be considered for “healing” (e.g., Baumeister et al., 1998; Westen, 1998). It has been said that “most of our conscious thoughts are lies and fictions” and that the start of the process of developing a sense of wholeness requires an active engagement with our unconscious (Fromm, 1994, p. 143). The term “healing” maybe defined as some degree of intra-personal “wholeness” (e.g., Powell, 2017).
Whilst there is a broad body of literature supporting the health and environment benefits of both social (e.g., Smith and Christakis, 2008) and environmental (inter-) connectedness (e.g., Cleary et al., 2017), there is less mainstream psychological interest about the importance of an integrated “self” (cf. Westen, 1992; Gigerenzer, 2007; Huta et al., 2012) and the role this could have in environmental and psychological well-being. However, the idea of an integrated (whole) self (cf. self-discrepancy theory: Higgins, 1987), forms a central feature of the act and art of psychotherapy (Jacobs, 2012). Bringing together the various disparate strands of the self (e.g., the unconscious into consciousness), and thus developing a greater depth and breadth of self-understanding, is its focus. The concept of the unconscious appears far less within mainstream health and environmental care literature (cf. Weintrobe, 2012).
It is the lesser-known parts of ourselves—the “shadow” selves (e.g., Bollas, 1987; Jung, 2014; Powell, 2018) that require greater attention if there is a genuine seriousness about eliciting change in the human condition. We will actively defend and justify the status quo of the system in which we operate because it largely prevents undue anxiety about the unpredictable nature of the world (Spinelli, 2007; Johnson and Fujita, 2012). The founder of rational emotive therapy Albert Ellis suggested that rational and conscious components of the psyche are more open to psychological interventions whereas the irrational and unconscious are “subtle and tricky” and less likely to be acknowledged or open to change: “Practically all humans … are powerfully predisposed to unconsciously and habitually prolonging their mental dysfunction … they are obsessed with the pleasures of the moment rather than of the future, and that … is the main …. source of their resistance” (Ellis, 1987, p. 365), and “We are never trickier than when we are rationalionizing our resistances” (Fromm, 1994, p. 115).
Human beings are adept at employing various, and largely unconscious strategies such as denial or suppression (see also constriction of awareness, Leigh and Reiser, 1982), that wishes the problem away or certainly our part in trying to solve or mitigate the problem. Or perhaps there is a tendency to maximize the importance of what we do (as academics) as a form of idealization (e.g., Trevithick, 2011), which then minimizes (de-values) other actions which could also be engaged in. Perhaps the state-of-affairs regarding both psychological and environmental health has not yet reached enough of a crisis for the pen to be given equal status with more directly relevant behaviors (unless these behaviors are perceived as someone else's responsibility?).
The profession of psychology (and others) promotes the important ability to debate a position from a critical perspective. However, this is rarely applied to our own embodied activities, beliefs and motivations. Without this critical reflexivity the defense of rationalization may develop, whereby we devise self-serving but incomplete explanations for our thoughts, emotions and behavior (e.g., Perry, 2014). An undefended testing of our own habitual positions in light of the knowledge we possess (Etherington, 2004; Finlay, 2008), allows a direct, experiential “knowing” and thus an empathic position about why others may also engage (or not) in important behavioral changes: we share greater similarities than differences. So alongside taking an authoritative position on the world through our choice of discipline, we spend some time developing an authoritative understanding of ourselves (Whitaker, 1976; Storr, 1999).
What are the differences?
Psychotherapy is, or indeed should be a counter-cultural undertaking (e.g., Griffin, 2006); we simply cannot afford to either see or accept “things” as they purportedly are. Societal pressures of conformity, cultural beliefs, and norms are often the precursors of psychological and environmental dis-ease. Social and cultural consensus does not necessarily equate to being heathy (Searle, 2010; Powell, 2018): “One demand made by our culture is like the demand of mother – we feel a symbiotic belongingness, addiction, & enslavement to the culture pattern” (Whitaker, 1976, p.156). Perhaps our chosen disciplines, symbolize all-knowing parents.
To effect difference, we first need to be “different”; practitioners need to act as role models, to demonstrate their commitment to the problems that they face, by being genuine to ourselves and to those that we seek to help or influence. Role modeling has been applied to affect change in various ways (Clark et al., 2001; Oberg and Frank, 2009; Rizq, 2009; Sally, 2010) including within psychotherapy (Jacobs, 1989; Yalom, 2003). We cannot afford to perpetuate any sense of hypocrisy. If our primary driver as academics is about “gleaning intellectual satisfaction from the work” (Powell, 2018, p. 28), then we need to rethink our position. Moreover, scientists might “abandon impact for insight” (Belli et al., 2015, p. 762): It's important to be clever but it's more important to be useful.
If there is to be an understanding about the “oneness” described in this volume as a sense of inter-connectedness, then there needs to be consideration of a broad and inclusive sense of what exactly we are, or indeed need to be, connecting with. Whilst a strength has been developed in the more objective (and general) view of health and environmental problems, there is far more work to be done from the subjective position to understand our own intra-personal connections and contradictions. Despite all the advances and developments of mainstream psychology there remains an impoverished understanding of the human condition. A contemplative, critically reflexive approach maybe personally challenging and yet it is a vital twin to the established objective approaches harnessed to tackle the problems we face.
“Trying to escape their inner struggles & contradictions they embraced unquestioningly one of …two sets of theories, blinding themselves to the merits of the other”
(Bettelheim, 1960, p. 7)
Publisher's note
All claims expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of their affiliated organizations, or those of the publisher, the editors and the reviewers. Any product that may be evaluated in this article, or claim that may be made by its manufacturer, is not guaranteed or endorsed by the publisher.
Statements
Author contributions
The author confirms being the sole contributor of this work and has approved it for publication.
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Dr. Paul Sparks and Dr. Alan Bainbridge for their helpful and insightful suggestions of earlier drafts of this paper.
Conflict of interest
The author declares that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
References
1
American Psychiatric Association (2013). Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5). Arlington, VA: American Psychiatric Association.
2
BainbridgeA.Del NegroG. (2020). An ecology of transformative learning: a shift from the ego to the eco. J. Transform. Educ.18, 41–58. 10.1177/1541344619864670
3
BarghJ. A. (2014). Our unconscious mind: unconscious impulses and desires impel what we think and do in ways Freud never dreamed of. Sci. Am.310, 30–37. 10.1038/scientificamerican0114-30
4
BarghJ. A.MorsellaE. (2008). The unconscious mind. Perspect. Psychol. Sci.3, 73–79. 10.1111/j.1745-6916.2008.00064.x
5
BatesonM. C.BatesonG. (2000). Steps to an Ecology of Mind. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
6
BaumeisterR. F.DaleK.SommerK. L. (1998). Freudian defense mechanisms and empirical findings in modern social psychology: reaction formation, projection, displacement, undoing, isolation, sublimation, and denial. J. Pers.66, 1081–1124. 10.1111/1467-6494.00043
7
BBC (2021, March 11). HSBC plans to phase out coal financing by 2040. Available online at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-56352203
8
BeidelD. C.TurnerS. M. (1986). A critique of the theoretical bases of cognitive behavioral theories and therapy. Clin. Psychol. Rev.6, 177–197. 10.1016/0272-7358(86)90011-5
9
BelliS.AcerosJ. C.HarréR. (2015). “It's all discursive!” Crossing boundaries and crossing words with Rom Harré. Univ. Psychol.14, 771–784. 10.11144/Javeriana.upsy14-2.iadc
10
BentallR. (1992). A proposal to classify happiness as a psychiatric disorder. J. Med. Ethics18, 94–98. 10.1136/jme.18.2.94
11
BettelheimB. (1960). The Informed Heart. London: Penguin Books.
12
BionW. R. (1961). Experiences in Groups and Other Papers. London: Tavistock Publication.
13
BollasC. (1987). The Shadow of the Object: Psychoanalysis of the Unthought Known. London: Free Association Books.
14
ClarkP. W.MartinC. A.BushA. J. (2001). The effect of role model influence on adolescents' materialism and marketplace knowledge. J. Mark. Theory Pract.9, 27–36. 10.1080/10696679.2001.11501901
15
ClearyA.FieldingK. S.BellS. L.MurrayZ.RoikoA. (2017). Exploring potential mechanisms involved in the relationship between eudaimonic wellbeing and nature connection. Landsc. Urban Plan.158, 119–128. 10.1016/j.landurbplan.2016.10.003
16
DalalF. (2018). CBT: The Cognitive Behavioural Tsunami: Managerialism, Politics and the Corruptions of Science. London: Routledge.
17
DiamondJ. (2004). Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed.London: Penguin Books.
18
DijksterhuisA.SmithP. K.van BaarenR. B.WigboldusD. H. J. (2005). The unconscious consumer: effects of environment on consumer behavior. J. Consum. Psychol.15, 193–202. 10.1207/s15327663jcp1503_3
19
DollR.HillA. B. (1954). The mortality of doctors in relation to their smoking habits: a preliminary report. Br. Med. J.228, 1451–1455. 10.1136/bmj.1.4877.1451
20
DreyfusH. L.DreyfusS. E. (1986). Mind Over Machine: The Power of Human Intuition and Expertise in the Era of the Computer. New York, NY: Free Press.
21
DruryW. H. (1998). Chance and Change: Ecology for Conservationists. Berkley, CA; University of California Press.
22
EllisA. (1987). The impossibility of achieving consistently good mental health. Am. Psychol.42, 364–375. 10.1037/0003-066X.42.4.364
23
EtheringtonK. (2004). Becoming a Reflexive Researcher. London: Jessica Kingsley Publications.
24
FinlayL. (2008). A dance between the reduction and reflexivity: explicating the "phenomenological psychological attitude.”J. Phenomenol. Psychol.39, 1–32. 10.1163/156916208X311601
25
FrickJ.KaiserF. G.WilsonM. (2004). Environmental knowledge and conservation behaviour: exploring prevalence and structure in a representative sample. Pers. Individ. Dif.37, 1597–1613. 10.1016/j.paid.2004.02.015
26
FrommE. (1994). The Art of Listening. London: Constable.
27
GigerenzerG. (2007). Gut Feelings: The Intelligence of the Unconscious. London: Viking Penguin.
28
GranieriA.La MarcaL.ManninoG.GiuntaS.GuglielmucciF.SchimmentiA. (2017). The relationship between defense patterns and DSM-5 maladaptive personality domains. Front. Psychol.8, 1926. 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01926
29
GriffinF. L. (2006). Teaching psychoanalytic psychotherapy: voices that have reach. J. Am. Psychoanal. Assoc.54, 1381–1391.10.1177/00030651060540040901
30
HardcastleV. G. (1995). A critique of information processing theories of consciousness. Mind Mach.5, 89–107. 10.1007/BF00974191
31
HerrnsteinR. J. (1990). Rational choice theory: necessary but not sufficient. Am. Psychol.45, 356–367. 10.1037/0003-066X.45.3.356
32
HicksD.BordA. (2001). Learning about global issues: why most educators only make things worse. Environ. Educ. Res.7, 413–425. 10.1080/13504620120081287
33
HigginsE. T. (1987). Self-discrepancy: A theory relating self and affect. Psychol Rev.94, 319–340. 10.1037/0033-295X.94.3.319
34
HutaV.PelletierL. G.BaxterD.ThompsonA. (2012). How eudaimonic and hedonic motives relate to the well-being of close others. J. Posit. Psychol.7, 399–404. 10.1080/17439760.2012.705318
35
JacksonS. E.BeardE.WestR.BrownJ. (2021). Evaluation of the London smoking cessation transformation programme: a time–series analysis. Addiction116, 1558–1568. 10.1111/add.15367
36
JacobsL. (1989). Dialogue in gestalt theory and therapy. Gestalt J.12, 25–67.
37
JacobsM. (2012). The Presenting Past: The Core of Psychodynamic Counselling and Therapy. Maidenhead: Open University Press.
38
JohnsonI. R.FujitaK. (2012). Change we can believe in: using perceptions of changeability to promote system-change motives over system-justification motives in information search. Psychol. Sci.23, 133–140. 10.1177/0956797611423670
39
JungC. G. (2014). On the Psychology of the Unconscious. Collected Works 7: Two Essays on Analytical Psychology. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.
40
KogerS. M.WinterD. D. N. (2011). The Psychology of Environmental Problems: Psychology for Sustainability. New York, NY: Psychology Press.
41
KollmusA.AgyemanJ. (2002). Mind the gap: why do people act environmentally and what are the barriers to pro-environmental behaviour?Environ. Educ. Res.8, 239–260. 10.1080/13504620220145401
42
LeighH.ReiserM. F. (1982). A general systems taxonomy for psychological defence mechanisms. J. Psychosom. Res.26, 77–81. 10.1016/0022-3999(82)90066-6
43
LondakovaK.ParkT.ReynoldsJ.WodakS. (2021). Net Zero: Principles for Successful Behaviour Change Initiatives: Key Principles From Past Government-Led Behaviour Change and Public Engagement Initiatives. Research Paper Number 2021/063. Behavioural Insights Team (Department for Businesses, Energy and Industrial Strategy). Open Government Licence, London.
44
LoughlandT.ReidA.WalkerK.PetoczP. (2003). Factors influencing young people's conceptions with places. Environ. Educ. Res.9, 3–19. 10.1080/13504620303471
45
McWilliamsN. (2011). Psychoanalytic Diagnosis: Understanding Personality Structure in the Clinical Process. New York, NY: The Guilford Press.
46
NottermanJ. M. (2000). Note on reductionism in cognitive psychology: reification of cognitive processes into mind, mind-brain equivalence, and brain-computer analogy. J. Theoret. Philos. Psychol.20, 116–121. 10.1037/h0091205
47
ObergE. B.FrankE. (2009). Physicians' health practices strongly influence patient health practices. J. R. Coll. Physicians Edinb.39, 290–291. 10.4997/JRCPE.2009.422
48
OishiS.GrahamJ. (2010). Social ecology: lost and found in psychological science. Perspect. Psychol. Sci.5, 356–377. 10.1177/1745691610374588
49
PerryJ. C. (2014). Anomalies and specific functions in the clinical identification of defense mechanisms. J. Clin. Psychol.70, 406–418. 10.1002/jclp.22085
50
PowellA. (2017). The Ways of the Soul: A Psychiatrist Reflects: Essays on Life, Death and Beyond.London: Muswell Hill Press.
51
PowellA. (2018). Conversations With the Soul: A Psychiatrist Reflects: Essays on Life, Death and Beyond.London: Muswell Hill Press.
52
ProctorR. N. (2004). The global smoking epidemic: a history and status report. Clin. Lung Cancer5, 371–376. 10.3816/CLC.2004.n.016
53
RitchieH.RoserM. (2013). Smoking. Retrieved from: https://ourworldindata.org/smoking (accessed January 21, 2022).
54
RizqR. (2009). Teaching and transformation: a psychoanalytical perspective on psychotherapeutic training. Br. J. Psychother.25, 3633380. 10.1111/j.1752-0118.2009.01131.x
55
RoseC. (2012). Self-Awareness and Personal Development: Resources for Psychotherapists and Counsellors. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.
56
SallyC. (Ed.). (2010). Transforming Behaviour: Pro-Social Modelling in Practice. London: Willan.
57
SampsonE. E. (1981). Cognitive psychology as ideology. Am. Psychol.36, 730–743. 10.1037/0003-066X.36.7.730
58
SchlamT. R.BakerT. B. (2013). Interventions for tobacco smoking. Annu. Rev. Clin. Psychol.9, 675–70210.1146/annurev-clinpsy-050212-185602
59
SchoreA. N. (2010). “The right brain implicit self: A central mechanism of the psychotherapy change process,” in Knowing, Not Knowing and Sort-of-Knowing: Psychoanalysis and the Experience of Uncertainty, Ed J. Petrucelli (London: Karnac), 177–202.
60
SearleJ. R. (2010). Making the Social World: The Structure of Human Civilization. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
61
SEI IISD, ODI, E3G, and, UNEP. (2021). The Production Gap Report 2021.
62
SennettR. (2013). Together: The rituals, Pleasures and Politics of Cooperation. London: Penguin Books.
63
ShiffmanS. (1993). Smoking cessation treatment: any progress?J. Consult. Clin. Psychol.61, 718–722. 10.1037/0022-006X.61.5.718
64
SmithK. P.ChristakisN. A. (2008). Social networks and health. Annu. Rev. Sociol.34, 405–429. 10.1146/annurev.soc.34.040507.134601
65
SpinelliE. (2007). Practising Existential Psychotherapy: The Relational World. London: Sage.
66
StorrA. (1999). The Art of Psychotherapy. London: Routledge.
67
TodresL. (2003). Humanising forces: phenomenology in science; psychotherapy in technological culture. Counsel. Psychother. Res.3, 196–203. 10.1080/14733140312331384352
68
ToomelaA. (2008). Variables in psychology: a critique of quantitative psychology. Integr. Psychol. Behav. Sci.42, 245–265. 10.1007/s12124-008-9059-6
69
TrevithickP. (2011). Understanding defences and defensiveness in social work. J. Soc. Work Pract.25, 389–412. 10.1080/02650533.2011.626642
70
Washington Post (2020, February 23). ‘Mad' Mike Hughes, who wanted to prove the flat-Earth theory, dies in homemade-rocket disaster. Available online at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/science/2020/02/23/mad-mike-hughes-dead/
71
WeintrobeS. (2012). Engaging With Climate Change: Psychoanalytic and Interdisciplinary Perspectives. London: Routledge.
72
WertzF. J. (1993). Cognitive psychology: a phenomenological critique. J. Theoret. Philos. Psychol.13, 2–24. 10.1037/h0091109
73
WestenD. (1992). The cognitive self and the psychoanalytic self: can we put ourselves together?Psychol. Inq.3, 1–13. 10.1207/s15327965pli0301_1
74
WestenD. (1998). The scientific legacy of Sigmund Freud: toward a psycho-dynamically informed psychological science. Psychol. Bull.124, 333–371. 10.1037/0033-2909.124.3.333
75
WhitakerC. (1976). “The hindrance of theory in clinical work,” in Family Therapy: Theory and Practice, ed P. J. Guerin (New York, NY: Gardener Press), 317–329.
76
WilsonA.MalatestaC. (1989). Affect and the compulsion to repeat: Freud's repetition compulsion revisited. Psychoanal. Contemp. Thought12, 265–312.
77
WilsonT. D. (2002). Strangers to ourselves: Discovering the adaptive unconscious.Harvard: Belknap Press.
78
World Health Organisation (2021). Tobacco. Available online at: https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/tobacco (accessed May 24, 2022).
79
YalomI. (2003). The Gift of Therapy: Reflections on Being a Therapist. London: Piacktus.
Summary
Keywords
environmental health, psychotherapy, unconscious, interdisciplinary, reflexivity
Citation
Hinds J (2022) Human and environmental health concerns: What differences are required to make the difference?. Front. Psychol. 13:845388. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.845388
Received
29 December 2021
Accepted
25 October 2022
Published
14 November 2022
Volume
13 - 2022
Edited by
Eric Brymer, Southern Cross University, Australia
Reviewed by
Simone Belli, Complutense University of Madrid, Spain; Holli-Anne Passmore, Concordia University of Edmonton, Canada; Osvaldo Santos, University of Lisbon, Portugal
Updates
Copyright
© 2022 Hinds.
This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
*Correspondence: Joe Hinds j.hinds@greenwich.ac.uk
This article was submitted to Environmental Psychology, a section of the journal Frontiers in Psychology
Disclaimer
All claims expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of their affiliated organizations, or those of the publisher, the editors and the reviewers. Any product that may be evaluated in this article or claim that may be made by its manufacturer is not guaranteed or endorsed by the publisher.