ORIGINAL RESEARCH article
Front. Phys.
Sec. Social Physics
Volume 13 - 2025 | doi: 10.3389/fphy.2025.1603371
This article is part of the Research TopicReal-World Applications of Game Theory and Optimization, Volume IIIView all 3 articles
A study on the financial information disclosure mechanism of digital intelligence based on the participation of four parties
Provisionally accepted
- Jiangsu University, Zhenjiang, China
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The digital era has brought about new vitality and innovation across various industries, introducing concepts such as AI, information centers, cloud data, the Internet of Things, and digital government. This article investigates the mechanisms of financial information disclosure within the context of digital transformation. A four-party game model is developed using a game approach, involving digitally-intelligent enterprises, financial data analysts, new quality productivity-based government, and fintech users. Through Matlab simulations, the evolutionary relationships and equilibrium game strategies among the four parties are examined. The research highlights the pivotal roles of enterprises and governments in shaping the evolutionary outcomes. By enhancing government regulations and improving the quality of digital intelligence disclosure by enterprises, a strategic evolution towards "information disclosure, intelligent decision-making, intensive regulation, and investment" is observed. This study contributes to the theoretical understanding of information disclosure within the digital-intelligent transformation framework, offering insights for promoting market stability and sustainable economic development.
Keywords: digital-intelligent transformation, Information disclosure, financial data analyst, New Quality Productivity, Government Regulation, Four-party evolutionary game
Received: 31 Mar 2025; Accepted: 28 Apr 2025.
Copyright: © 2025 YAO and Sun. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
* Correspondence: Yinan Sun, Jiangsu University, Zhenjiang, China
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