Depression as Inferential Rigidity: A Meta-Abductive Account

Jian SUN^1*Li JIN^2*

• ¹Guangxi Minzu Normal University, Chongzuo, China
• ²Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China

Abstract: This paper proposes a novel account of depressive cognition by arguing that its persistence and rigidity are maintained not primarily by the content of negative beliefs, but by a specific structural pathology in the form of reasoning. Drawing on a hierarchical reconstruction of Peircean abduction, the paper develops a three-layer model of depressive inferential pathology. At the first layer, depressive cognition is characterized by the fixation of negatively self-referential first-order abductive explanations, resulting in a progressive narrowing of explanatory space. At the core layer, a failure of meta-abduction prevents subjects from reflecting on and revising their own explanatory practices, thereby eliminating cognitive adaptability. At the third layer, rigid abductive conclusions are treated as absolute premisesin deductivereasoning, giving rise todestructive conclusionsand closed ruminative loops. The model accounts for central clinical phenomena such as rumination and cognitive distortion, explains the persistence and rigidity of depressive beliefs, and clarifies how situationally intelligible responses can develop into chronic pathology. By integrating abductive reasoning theory, embodied cognition, existential phenomenology, and epistemic consequentialism, the paper offers a unified framework that bridges philosophical psychiatry and clinical theory. The analysis suggests that effective intervention, alongside other approaches, should focus not merely on correcting belief content, but on restoring meta-abductive capacity—that is, the ability to treat one's own explanatory practices as open to revision.